Iraq invasion would be error to rival Hitler's attack on Russia The Times
May 25, 2002
Analysis by General Michael RoseTHE defeat of the Taleban and al-Qaeda armies in Afghanistan, which presented an old-fashioned, conventional opposition to the US-led forces, was quick and without undue casualties.
But as Wellington said after the British Army had occupied Kabul in 1839, virtually without opposition, "the difficulties begin where the military successes have ended`". Eight months after US forces entered Afghanistan there is little sign that the allies' strategy has sufficiently acknowledged that the nature of the conflict has radically changed and that kinetic energy weapon systems - however smart - cannot defeat guerrillas or suppress terrorism.
As Wellington added on the British Army's conduct of operations during the First Afghan War, "countries are not conquered by running up the hills and firing at long distances".
Nor would the defeat of terrorism be brought any closer by the overthrow of dictators or corrupt rulers whose states sponsor terrorism. Indeed, direct military action against countries like Iraq or Iran will only add to the numbers prepared to carry out terrorist acts against the West.
The Clausewitzian model of warfare, in which a government, people and army sought to achieve victory over the enemy through superior military force, is clearly less relevant to President Bush's global war against terrorism than the complex principles that govern modern revolutionary war.
Revolutionary and terrorist wars are more about changing the attitudes of people than destroying an army. Victory can be achieved only by isolating the terrorists from the mass of the people and by obtaining sufficient intelligence to limit their military options.
Therefore to launch a ground offensive against Iraq at this time would represent an enormous and terrible strategic blunder in the war against terrorism. Even if such a second front could be justified in terms of the suppression of terrorism (and there is no certainty that President Saddam Hussein was involved in the events of September 11), the risks and potentially negative consequences far outweigh any possible benefits.
First, any military action would have to achieve total success with great rapidity for the US and its allies: moderate Arab rulers who might be persuaded to turn a blind eye to such an operation could not afford to get involved in protracted operations. If the offensive did not succeed almost at once there would be increasing popular opposition to the military action, especially within neighbouring Arab states, and also in America if serious casualties occurred.
Second, there is no viable opposition to Saddam in Iraq as there was to the Taleban in Afghanistan, and even if the Republican Guard were destroyed, it is nonsense to assume that the regime would fall with its destruction. The security apparatus in Iraq controls every level of society and there is little chance of a spontaneous uprising of the Iraqi people after so many years of oppression.
Third, a ground offensive in Iraq would be an extremely difficult operation to mount logistically, with long lines of communication and limited, if any, forward operating bases, for the US would not be able to count on the same level of military support as it had during the Gulf War from neighbouring Arab states. Even then it took many months of military build-up before the operation to recover Kuwait could be launched in 1991.
Finally, the invasion of Iraq by Americans would represent an enormous propaganda victory for the extremist Islamic movements and make the job of winning the war against terrorism almost impossible.
If the present US Administration's debate about the feasibility of launching a ground offensive against Iraq is merely designed to put pressure on Saddam in order to get him to comply with UN Security Council resolutions regarding weapons inspections then there may be some merit in the debate.
If, on the other hand, the debate is intended by the US as a warning to its allies that such an attack is about to happen, then every effort should be made by those close to President Bush, including our own Prime Minister, to persuade the US not to embark on an operation that would equate in terms of folly with Germany's decision to attack Russia during the Second World War.
General Rose was Commander of the UN Protection Force, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994-95.