The ministers in the new Iraqi government have been chosen on the basis of ethnic background rather than expertise.
Deccan Herald
May 8, 2005
Michael Jansen in NicosiaIraq's first elected government in half a century was sworn in last week at a time of increasing Sunni-Shia tension and rising insurgent violence against Iraqi policemen, administrators and US troops. But instead of being an historic occasion, the event revealed that Iraq's new rulers are more interested in securing posts for themselves than running the country. Only 28 of the cabinet's 37 members took the oath of office.
Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari had tried mightily but failed to reach agreement on candidates for two of his four deputies – a woman and a Sunni – and on the key ministries of oil and electricity, destined for Shias, defence, industry and human rights, allocated to Sunnis. Only half the 274 members of Parliament attended the event which was boycotted by Vice-President Ghazi Yawar and two Sunni ministers protesting the handling of Sunni appointments.
The drawbacks
Since Jaafari was formally asked by the presidential council to form a cabinet a month ago, wrangling over posts has exposed the weaknesses of the communal system of governance introduced by the US in 2003. Washington adopted a communal approach to Iraq even before the war when it concluded anti-Saddam Hussein alliances with Kurds who have been struggling to secede from the Iraqi state since the 1920s and religious Shias who have been fighting for an Islamic government since 1957. Once Saddam Hussein had been toppled, Washington opted for what is, essentially, bicommunal power-sharing between Shias, 60 per cent of the populace with 148 seats in the assembly, and Kurds, 15-18 per cent with 77 seats.The distribution of portfolios is meant to be 15 for Shias, seven for Kurds, seven for Sunnis and one for a Christian. Who got what so far is significant. The Shias took four top jobs. Jaafari, a medical doctor and spokesman for the Islamic Dawa party, is prime minister; Ahmad Chalabi, a secular Shia, former Pentagon favourite and fugitive from justice in Jordan, is deputy premier; Bayan Jabr, a senior official of the Shia Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with connections to its military wing, the Badr Corps, is minister of interior with responsibility for domestic security forces; and an independent Islamist, Ali Allawi, is finance minister.
The Kurds secured three senior posts plus the presidency which was assumed by Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The two blocs filled their allotted posts by horse-trading. But this did not happen when it came to the Sunnis, who constitute 20 per cent of the population. They have only 17 seats in the assembly because of a concerted campaign initiated by the US to marginalise the community, insurgent violence in the three Sunni majority provinces and a boycott of the poll called by Sunni leaders.
Sunni role
To redress the lack of Sunni representation and encourage moderate Sunnis to support the government, Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani urged Shias to give Sunnis 10 cabinet posts. At least four candidates were nominated but deputies belonging to the United Iraqi Alliance, the Shia umbrella grouping, vetoed them on the ground that they had connections with the ousted Baath party. The appointment of a Sunni deputy premier was blocked for the same reason. An authoritative Iraqi source told the Deccan Herald that Shias exercising the veto belong to a group dubbed the "Safawis," Persians or pro-Iranians. This group is competing for power with Shias regarded as "Arabs," those loyal to Iraq rather than Iran.Rule by theologians
The head of the "Safawis" is Abdel Aziz Hakim, the SCIRI chief, while the mentor of the "Arabs" is Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani who, although an Iranian by birth, rejects both Iranian interference and the Iranian model of vilayet-i-faqih, rule by theologians. Sunni Iraqis – who do not recognise the distinction between these competing factions – consider the new cabinet to be an Iranian imposition. Unless Shias and Kurds reach out to Sunnis and include them in the cabinet and the process of drafting a new constitution for the country, the insurgency could lead to all-out civil war. If this were to happen, the Kurds, whose real goal is independence, could secede and the Shias could set up their own state in the southern provinces, leaving the central region which has no oil to the Sunnis. Communal governance was the worst possible choice for Iraq.