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Stemming over VN-resoluties tegen kernwapens

Nieuwe Agenda Coalitie stelt serieuze stappen tegen proliferatie van kernwapens voor

[Aanvulling, red.] De stemming over de 'New Agenda Coalition' resoluties over nucleaire ontwapening in het First Committee in de VN, zal zeer waarschijnlijk op woensdag as, 29 oktober plaatsvinden in New York.

PERSBERICHT 24 OKT 2003

Volgende week worden in de ´First Committee´ van de Verenigde Naties, die handelt over ontwapeningsvraagstukken, een reeks resoluties over nucleaire ontwapening behandelt. De belangrijkste daarvan zijn de twee resoluties (tekst hieronder) van de Nieuwe Agenda Coalitie, een groep landen die sinds 1998 dergelijke resoluties heeft ingediend. (tot de Coalitie behoren Brazilië, Egypte, Ierland, Mexico, Nieuw Zeeland, Zuid-Afrika, Zweden).

Bij voorgaande gelegenheden (de resoluties komen elk jaar in stemming) heeft Nederland zich steeds onthouden van stemming en één keer voorgestemd, in 2000. Hoewel deze resoluties altijd door een grote meerderheid worden aangenomen in de ´First Committee´ en vervolgens in de Algemene Vergadering, is een ´ja´ stem van de NAVO lidstaten van groot belang.

De kernwapenstaten nemen geen serieuze stappen naar nucleaire ontwapening. Integendeel, Rusland handhaaft haar arsenaal van sub-strategische kernwapens voor eventueel gebruik op het slagveld, terwijl de VS nieuwe types kernwapens aan het ontwikkelen is. In Nederland liggen, zoals bekend, in het kader van het nucleaire beleid van de NAVO al jarenlang kernwapens opgeslagen voor gebruik door bommenwerpers van de Koninklijke Luchtmacht. De werking van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag, bedoeld om de verspreiding van kernwapens en kernwapen technologie tegen te gaan, wordt door dit beleid systematies ondermijnt.

Deze opstelling bevordert bovendien de proliferatie van kernwapens naar andere landen, die immers redeneren dat als de belangrijkste staten zich niet aan de verplichtingen tot nucleaire ontwapening hoeven te houden, zij dat ook niet hoeven. (India, Pakistan en Israël zijn drie onofficiële kernwapenstaten). De huidige proliferatie crises rond Noord Korea en Iran zouden aanzienlijk eenvoudiger op te lossen te zijn als internationale afspraken over nucleaire ontwapening werden nageleefd.

De regeringen van de lidstaten van de Nieuwe Agenda Coalitie hebben tot doel om de kernwapenstaten en hun bondgenoten aan die beloftes te herinneren. Om die reden is het van belang dat de NAVO bondgenoten van de VS voor de resolutie stemmen.

Informatie: Karel Koster 06 1322 33 59

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Verenigde Naties First Committee

Towards a nuclear weapon free world: a new agenda
Draft resolution New Agenda Coalition October 2003

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/77 Y of 4 December 1998, 54/54 G of 1 December 1999, 55/33 C of 20 November 2000 and 57/59 of 22 November 2002,
Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to the survival of humanity and that the only real guarantee against these weapons is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again,

Convinced also that the retention of nuclear weapons carries the inherent risk of contributing to proliferation and falling into the hands of non-State actors,
Reaffirming that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing processes and that a fundamental pre-requisite for promoting nuclear nonproliferation is continuous irreversible progress in nuclear arms reductions,
Declaring that the participation of the international community as a whole is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability and that international security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement,
Declaring also that internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security and that unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament,
Noting the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996, 1
Declaring that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear- weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security,
Declaring that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons2 is binding on the States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that it is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and that the undertakings therein on nuclear disarmament have been given and that implementation of them remains the imperative, Expressing its deep concern at the limited progress to date in implementing the thirteen steps on nuclear disarmament to which all States parties agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3
Expressing its deep concern at the continued failure of the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and international and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives;
Expressing grave concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force, 4

[VERWIJZING NAAR AMERIKAANSE WEIGERING TE RATIFICEREN, red.]

Stressing the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Noting the successful completion in September 2002 of the first phase of the Trilateral Initiative - involving the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States - which aims to enable the placement of excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons under international safeguards,
Convinced that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons constitutes an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process,

[CONNECTIE NAVO EN RUSLAND SUB-STRATEGISCHE KERNWAPENS, red.]

Noting that, despite bilateral agreements, there is no sign of engagement of all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Declaring that it is essential that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility should apply to all nuclear disarmament measures,
Expressing its deep concern at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States - India, Israel and Pakistan - that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, in particular given the effects of regional volatility on international security, and in this context, the continued regional tensions and deteriorating security situation in South Asia and the Middle East,
Expressing also its deep concern at the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and at its decision to restart the Yongbyon nuclear reactor without IAEA safeguards,
Expressing concern that the development of missile defenses could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space and stressing that no steps should be taken which would lead to the weaponization of outer space, Expressing its deep concern about emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use of, and the possible development of new types of, nuclear weapons,

[VERWIJZING NAAR VS ´MINI-NUKES´PROGRAMMA, BIJNA DOOR CONGRES HEEN, red.]

Welcoming further the progress in the development of nuclear-weapon- free zones,
Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration5, in which the Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,
Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all the States parties to the Treaty are committed under Article VI of the Treaty, 6

1. Reaffirms that any possibility that nuclear weapons could be used represents a continued risk for humanity; VERWIJZING VS KERNWAPEN DOCTRINE
2. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; ONTWIKKELING NIEUWE KERNWAPENS
3. Calls upon all States to fulfil all their obligations under international treaties and international law in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
4. Calls upon all States parties to pursue, with determination, the full and effective implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the outcome of which provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament;
5. Agrees on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications required to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; VERWIJZING NAAR VS, CHINA NON-RATIFICATIE
6. Calls for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
7. Underlines the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the context of the progress in implementing the international monitoring system;
8. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reductions agreements or initiatives, and to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment;

   [VERWIJZING NAAR MOSCOW TREATY DIE JUIST WEL KAN TERUGGEDRAAID WORDEN, red.]

9. Acknowledges that the reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty")7 represents a positive step in the relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, and calls on them to make the Treaty verifiable, irreversible and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it a nuclear disarmament measure;
10. Agrees that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher priority, as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, and be carried out in a comprehensive manner:
    
    1. further reductions and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
    2. reductions to be carried out in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner;
    3. the preservation, reaffirmation and implementation of the 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic/Russian Federation;
    4. the formalization by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of their Presidential Nuclear Initiatives into legally-binding instruments, and the initiation of negotiations on further reductions of these weapons;
    5. the enhancement of special security and the physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, inter alia, the placing of these weapons in physically secure central storage sites, with a view to their removal and subsequent destruction by the nuclear-weapon States as a part of the nuclear disarmament process to which they are committed under the NPT, and the necessary steps taken by all nuclear-weapon States in possession of such weapons in this regard;
    6. further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons systems;
    7. concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, so as to reduce the risk of use of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
    8. the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possess these weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or rationalizations for their use;
    9. the prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States, and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of elimination of these weapons;

    [DE BEKENDE STAPPEN NAAR NUCLEAIRE ONTWAPENING, VOORAL VERWIJZING SUBSTRATEGISCHE KERNWAPENS, ZOALS DIE VAN RUSLAND EN NAVO, red.]

11. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures;
12. Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should establish, without delay, an appropriate ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;
13. Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives;
14. Agrees also that the Conference on Disarmament should complete the examination and updating of the mandate on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, as contained in its decision of 13 February 1992, and re-establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible;
15. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
16. Notes that the third and, as appropriate, the fourth meeting of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, taking into account the deliberations and results of the previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a report containing recommendations to the Review Conference;
17. Stresses the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
18. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances, pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties;

    [HET CRUCIALE PUNT VAN DE NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES, DIE ONDERMIJND WORDEN DOOR DREIGEMENTEN OM BIO-CHEMISCHE WAPEN INZET TE BEANTWOORDDEN MET KERNWAPENS. red.]

19. Notes the proposals on security assurances that has been submitted to the States parties of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and calls upon the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons to make time available to thoroughly consider the matter of security assurances at the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee so as to make recommendations to the Review Conference on how to take the matter forward;
20. Calls upon those three States - India, Israel and Pakistan -, which are not yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 19978, for ensuring nuclear nonproliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;
21. Reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament;
22. Expresses concern at tensions in the Middle East and South Asia and renews the support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;
23. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol;
24. Calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its recent announcements, with a view to being in full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in this connection supports all diplomatic efforts for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation, and for the establishment of an area free of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula;
25. Stresses that the International Atomic Energy Agency must be able to verify and ensure that nuclear facilities of the States Parties of the NPT are being used for peaceful purposes only, and calls upon States to cooperate fully and immediately with the International Atomic Energy Agency in resolving issues arising from the implementation of their respective obligations towards the Agency;
26. Calls on the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approach the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out the verification requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed by the two States on the basis of the model legal framework that has been agreed and that is now available to be used in new verification agreements between the IAEA and the Russian Federation or the United States of America;
27. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;
28. Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;
29. Acknowledges the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 57/599, and requests him, within existing resources, to prepare a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
30. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session the item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: a new agenda", and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

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Verenigde Naties

Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 55/33 C of 20 November 2000, 57/59 of 22 November 2002 and 57/58 of 22 November 2002,
Stressing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under its article VI,[1] Recognising that disarmament and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Reaffirming the necessity of strict compliance at all times and in all circumstances by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the necessity of upholding their commitments in the decisions and final documents agreed at the 2000 and 1995 Review Conference,
Noting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996,
Reiterating the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States for transparent, verifiable and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons leading to nuclear disarmament,[2]
Stressing the commitment made in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,[3]
Convinced that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons constitutes an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process,
Concerned about the threat posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons due to their portability, proximity to areas of conflict and probability of pre-delegation in case of military conflict, and thus about the risk of proliferation and of early, pre-emptive, unauthorised or accidental use,
Concerned about emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including the possible development of new types of low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons,
Concerned about the increased risk of non-strategic nuclear weapons being used, Taking into consideration the lack of transparency and of formal agreements with regards to non-strategic nuclear weapons,
Emphasizing that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher priority, as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, and be carried out in a comprehensive manner,

1. Agrees that further reductions and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be based on unilateral initiatives and included as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process; HANDVAT VOOR VERWIJDERING NAVO KERNWAPENS UIT NEDERLAND
2. Agrees further that reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner;
3. Agrees on the importance of preserving, reaffirming and implementing the 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-strategic nuclear weapons;
4. Calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to formalise their Presidential Nuclear Initiatives into legally-binding instruments and to initiate negotiations on further reductions of these weapons;
5. Stresses the importance of the enhancement of special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, inter alia, the placing of these weapons in physically secure central storage sites, with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination by the nuclear-weapon States as a part of the nuclear disarmament process to which they are committed under the NPT, and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States in possession of such weapons to take the necessary steps in this regard;

   [WEDEROM EEN AANLOOP TOT VERWIJDERING, red.]

6. Calls for further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons systems;
7. Calls also for concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems, so as to reduce the risk of use of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
8. Stresses the need for an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possess these weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or rationalisations for their use;
9. Calls for the prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons;
10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session an item entitled "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons".

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